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Abstract—A fast and secure key distribution system is shown that oper-
ates in classical channels but with a dynamic protection given by the shot
noise of light. The binary signals in the communication channel are pro-
tected by coding in random bases and by addition of physical noise that
was recorded and added bit by bit to the signals. While the resulting sig-
nals are classical they carry the uncontrollable randomness information in
the signal sent. The legitimate users start with a shared secret between
them creating a measuring advantage over the adversary. This way the
introduced noise does not affect the users but frustrates the attacker.
Index Terms—Random, physical processes, cryptography, privacy am-
plification.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fast and secure key distribution system is presented to op-
erate in generic communication channels, including wireless
channels. The transmitted signals are deterministic (or perfectly
copied) but include continuously recorded random noise that
frustrates an attacker to obtain useful information. This noise
affects the attacker but not the legitimate users that share an ini-
tial shared secret bit sequence c0. The legitimate users will end
up with a continuous supply of fresh keys that can be used even
to encrypt information bit-to-bit in large volumes and fast rates.
The wireless key distribution system discussed in this work
uses the intrinsic light noise of a laser beam to frustrate an at-
tacker to extract meaningful signals. However, this noise is not
in the communication channel but it is recorded before reaching
the channel.
Historically, cryptography using optical noise from coherent
states in a communication channel can be traced back to [1]
and [2]. The first uses quantum demolition measurements and
quadrature measurements while the second uses direct measure-
ments with no need for phase references or quantum features
besides the presence of optical noise. The methods and tech-
niques used are widely different. The use of the optical noise
in this paper has a relationship to the one originally used in [2],
where fiber optics communication in a noisy channel blocked
information leakage to an adversary. An initial shared infor-
mation on a M -ry coding protocol used by the legitimate users
allowed them to extract more information from the channel than
the one obtained by the adversary. More recently that original
idea was improved with a specific privacy amplification pro-
tocol [3] while keeping the use of an optical communication
channel.
The present work merges main ideas of the protection given
by the light’s noise in a protocol applied to wireless chan-
nels. Seed ideas on the use of a wireless channels using
recorded physical noise were introduced from 2005 to 2007 [4].
This work brings those ideas of wireless channels secured by
recorded optical noise to a practical level. It also opens up the
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possibility to immediate application of the technique to mobile
devices. This new scheme is detailed and the associated security
level is calculated. This system performs one-time-pad encryp-
tion with the securely distributed keys.
Symmetric keys with end-to-end encryption, where keys are
kept secret by the users, may provide perfect secure communi-
cation for companies. Government distribution of keys for their
users could guarantee secure communication among users as
well as dispose of tools to access necessary exchanged informa-
tion whenever a strong need exists. In the same way, companies
that distribute keys for their users could comply with legal re-
quirements such as the All Writs Act (AWA) - as long as their
key repository are kept under control.
A step-by-step description of this system will be made along
this paper. The key distribution system not just generates and
distribute cryptographic keys but also provide functions like en-
cryption and decryption between users (or “stations”) A and B:
It is a platform for secure communications.
II. PLATFORM FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of this platform for one
of the users, say A. Users A and B have similar platforms.
Communication between A and B proceeds through the com-
munication ports of a PC with access to the Internet (Top portion
of Fig. 1). This PC works as the interface with the exterior and
is isolated from the platform (Bottom of Fig. 1) by an air gap.
In other words, the platform has no direct access to or from the
Internet. Data flow in and out is done through a Dynamic mem-
ory conjugate with OR switches that only allow authenticated
and fixed size packets.
The platform is roughly composed of two opto-electronic
parts: 1) A fast Physical Random Bit Generator (PhRBG) and 2)
a Noise Generator. The PhRBG delivers bits to a Bit Pool where
a Privacy Amplification (PA) protocol is applied and encryption
and decryption functions are performed. Description of these
parts will be made along the paper; they are intertwined in their
functionalities as as such their understanding are necessary for a
full comprehension of the proposed system. A PC-mother board
(not discussed in this paper) in the platform perform several op-
erations and provide access for the users, including a graphical
interface for platform control.
Although this is a quite general system allowing privacy in
communications one could mention a few applications like se-
cure communications for embassies or the secure transfer of
large volumes of patient data among medical centers and in-
surance companies.
III. PHYSICAL RANDOM BIT GENERATOR
The fast Physical Random Bit Generator (PhRBG) is of a
novel type described in Ref. [5]. The PhRBG extract broad
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EACH STATION (A OR B) IS PHYSICALLY CONTROLLED BY EACH USER
AND IS COMPOSED OF AN IP CONNECTED PC THAT EXCHANGE
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN STATIONS. THE PLATFORM HAS NO DIRECT
CONNECTION TO THE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS. DATA FLOW IN AND
OUT FROM THE PLATFORM TO THE COMMUNICATION PC IS DONE
THROUGH A DYNAMIC MEMORY AND OR SWITCHES. THIS MEMORY
CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS ONLY ALLOWING TRANSIT OF AUTHENTICATED
PACKETS WITH FIXED SIZE. THE PLATFORM CONTAINS THE PHYSICAL
RANDOM BIT GENERATOR (PHRBG), A BIT POOL AND A NOISE
GENERATOR TO EFFICIENTLY MIMIC THE OPTICAL SHOT NOISE OF A
NOISY OPTICAL COMMUNICATION CHANNEL.
bandwidth fluctuations (shot-noise) of a laser light beam and
delivers random voltage signals (V+, V−) –signals that can be
expressed as random bits– to the Bit Pool.
Fig. 2 provides more details. Left upper part of Fig. 2 shows
the PhRBG. A laser beam excites a multi-photon detector and
the voltage output pass through amplifiers G and an analog-to-
digital (ADC) converter. The laser intensity I1 and the gain
G are adjusted to enhance the current from the noisy optical
signals well above electronic noises:
(∆Ilight)2 (∆Ielectronic)2 . (1)
It also necessary to work below the range where the ratio
noise/signal is too small. In terms of the number of photons
n:
Noise
Signal
=
√
(〈∆n〉)2
〈n〉 =
1√〈n〉 → not small . (2)
In other words, the desired signals are optimized optical shot-
noise signals that allow a good number of detection levels from
an ADC. The stream of digitalized fluctuating signals are clas-
sified within short time intervals in signals above the average
value as bit 1 signals (V+) while signals below the average are
identified as bit 0 signals (V−).
Sampling time for acquisition of the bit signals are set much
shorter than the coherence time of the laser used. By doing
so samplings occur within a fixed optical phase of the sampled
photons. This leads to photon number fluctuations that are max-
imal: Although phase and number (or photon amplitude) are not
strictly conjugate variables, there is an uncertainty relationship
for number and phase.
The individual bit signals generated by the PhRBG around
time instants ti will be designated by ai and a sequence of ai
by a. Notation a sometimes designates a sequence of bits or the
size of this sequence whenever this does no give rise to nota-
tional problems.
User A wants to transmit in a secure way these random a bits
to user B.
detector
BS
BS𝐼𝐼0
𝐼𝐼1
𝐼𝐼2 = 𝐼𝐼0 − 𝐼𝐼1
BIT POOL
(PA)
+
+
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝑧𝑧
A
to B
detector
G G
G
(𝑉𝑉+,𝑉𝑉−)ADC
ADC
classifier
+,-
laser
PhRBG
Noise
Generator
Fig. 2
HARDWARE TO GENERATE RANDOM BITS (PHRBG), NOISE GENERATOR
AND BIT POOL FOR PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION. THE BIT POOL CONTAIN
MEMORIES AND A FPGA (FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY) TO
PERFORM FAST OPERATIONS LOCALLY.
Appendix A comments on the PhRBG.
IV. BIT POOL AND NOISE GENERATOR
Fig. 2 also shows at the right upper side a Bit Pool where ran-
dom bits generated from the PhRBG are stored together with
bits bi that were already acquired and recorded. The initial se-
quence {b0} is taken from a secret sequence c0 of size c0 =ma
initially shared between the legitimate users. The Bit Pool out-
puts signals bi + ai. Bits bi act as a modulation or encryption
signals to the random bits ai. After application of the PA pro-
tocol a final distillation of z bits, over which the attacker has
no knowledge, will be available for encryption and decryption
purposes. A full discussion of these operations are made ahead
when discussing the physical modulation of the signals and the
Privacy Amplification protocol.
A. Noise Generator and recorded optical shot-noise
Bottom part of Fig. 2 shows the Noise Generator. A laser
beam with intensity I2 is detected, amplified to produce optical
shot noise limited signals. These signals are digitalized produc-
ing a sequence of independent noise signals VN = {Vi}. Vi is
added to the signals ai + bi giving ai + bi + Vi and sent to B.
The noise contribution VN replaces the intrinsic optic noise in
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an optical channel. The magnitude and format of this noise will
be shown after presenting the idea of M−ry bases.
The first modulation signal b0 is defined by m random bits
from c0. In general the modulating random signal bi can be
seen as a transmission basis for ai. One may as well see bits ai
as a message and bi as an encrypting signal. To generate each bi,
or one number among M , m bits are necessary (m= log2M ).
It is to be understood that the M−ry coding interleaves bits
in the sense that the same bit signal superposed to a basis bk
representing a bit 1 (or 0) represents the opposite bit 0 (or 1) in
a neighbor basis bk−1 or bk+1. For example, see Fig. 1 in [3] for
a physical representation of these interleaved bits in the optical
phase space. Other possible realization of distinct neighboring
levels with distinct bits could be made with levels separated by
small physical displacements different from phase, e.g. ampli-
tude, as shown in Fig. 3. This, together with the added noise VN
do not allow the attacker to obtain the bit ai.
B. Noise Generator andM−ry bases
As shown in the bottom right part of Fig. 2 a random signal
Vi is added to ai + bi, giving ai + bi + Vi to be sent to B. It
is emphasized that although the signal sent from A to B is de-
terministic, Vi is a recorded random noise that varies from bit
to bit. A recorded signal is deterministic by definition because
it can be perfectly copied. However, this recorded noise is an
instance of an unpredictable event by nature.
In nature the noise intensity is continuous but the recorded
digitalized noise is distributed among the M levels supplied
by an Analog to Digital Converter. This statistical distribution
among M levels also has a characteristic deviation σV . This
will be discussed ahead.
The noise signal Vi is derived from a split beam of intensity
I2 (see left bottom part of Fig. 2). Light from this derived beam
excites a multi-photon detector, the output is amplified by G
and digitalized. An extra amplifier G may be adjusted to levels
compatible to the signal ai+bi. In other words, the added noise
mix potential bases and bits so that the attacker could not iden-
tify either the bit or the basis sent. Fig. 3 sketches the addition
of the random basis bi and the added noise Vi. The attacker does
not know either the basis bi neither the noise Vi and, therefore,
cannot deduce the bit sent ai from the total signal ai + bi +Vi.
V. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION AND FRESH BIT
GENERATION BY A AND B
The Privacy Amplification process to be utilized was first
shown in Section IX of Ref. [3]; it utilized the formalism origi-
nally developed in Ref. [6]. In the present work it is applied to
a classical communication channel instead of a noisy fiber optic
channel.
Briefly, the following steps are performed:
1) The Bit Pool starts with the bit sequence of size c0 = ms
(bits bi) already shared by A and B. A sequence a of bits, a =
{ai}, is generated by the PhRBG and stored in the Bit Pool by
user A. The sequence a is sent from A to B after the preparation
that add bases and noise. A number of bits a+ma is used for
the task of creating bits ai and bases bi to be sent from A to B
as {ai + bi}.
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TOP - THE PHYSICAL AMPLITUDE SIGNAL REPRESENTING A GIVEN BASIS
bi IS ADDED TO THE SIGNAL REPRESENTING A BIT ai . THE BASIS SIGNAL
IS KNOWN TO USERS A AND B BUT NOT TO THE ATTACKER. A SIGNAL ai
IS TO BE SEEN AS A GIVEN BIT IN BASIS bi (1 OR 0) BUT THIS SAME
SIGNAL ai WILL BE SEEN AS THE OPPOSITE BIT (0 OR 1) WHEN ATTACHED
TO NEIGHBORING BASES bi+1 OR bi−1 . THEREFORE EVEN A SMALL
NOISE Vi ADDED TO ai+ bi DO NOT ALLOW AN ATTACKER TO KNOW
WHICH BASES HAVE BEEN USED. HOWEVER, BOTH A AND B KNOW bi
AND THUS THE BIT SENT ai CAN BE EXTRACTED. PHYSICALLY, DISTINCT
MODULATION VOLTAGE SIGNALS MAY REPRESENT BITS AND BASES.
THERE ARE M BASES; THEY CAN BE ASSUMED SEPARATED BY Vmax/M .
A BIT 1 AND A BIT 0 CAN BE ASSUMED PHYSICALLY SEPARATED BY
Vmax/2. VOLTAGE SIGNALS CAN BE ASSUMED CYCLIC IN THE SENSE
THAT Vmax+ → . BOTTOM - THE AMPLITUDE BETWEEN A SIGNAL ai
REPRESENTING A BIT AND THE OPPOSITE ONE IS GREATER THAN THE
NOISE RANGE. AS VOLTAGE MODULATION OF SIGNALS REPRESENTING 1
AND 0 ARE SEPARATED BY Vmax/2 THIS ALLOWS A PRECISE BIT
DETERMINATION BY THE LEGITIMATE USERS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE
ATTACKER STRUGGLES UNSUCCESSFULLY WITH RESOLUTION OF
NEIGHBOURING LEVELS.
2) An instance of a universal hash function f is sent from A
to B.
3) The probability for information leakage of bits obtained by
the attacker over the sequence sent is calculated (as indicated
ahead), generating the parameter t (number of possibly leaked
bits). In other words, from sequence {0,1}n the attacker may
capture {0,1}t.
The PA protocol includes the following steps: From the n =
a+ b bits stored in the Bit Pool, t bits are destroyed:
{0,1}n→{0,1}n−t . (3)
An extra number of bits λ is reduced as a security parameter [6].
This reduction in bit numbers is then
{0,1}n→{0,1}n−t→{0,1}n−t−λ (4)
where {0,1}n−t−λ is the final number of bits. The initial total
amount of bits n in the Bit Pool was then reduced to r = n−
t−λ. These remaining bits are then further randomized by the
PA protocol [3]. The protocol establishes that the attacker has
4no information on these reduced and “shuffled” number of bits
r.
The number r of bits can be rearranged in sizes as follows
r = n− t−λ= (a+ b)− t−λ= (a− t−λ) + b
= (a− t−λ) +ma≡ z+ma . (5)
The sequence of size z ≡ (a− t−λ) (see output from Bit Pool
in Fig. 2) will be used as fresh bits for encryption while the
sequence of size ma will form the new bases {bi} for the next
round of bit distribution. The process can proceed without the
legitimate users having to meet or use a courier to refresh an
initial sequence ma. Other rounds then may proceed.
The PA theory [6] says that after reducing the initial number
of bits from n= a+ma (ma initially shared and a fresh bits) to
r = n− t−λ, the amount of information that may be acquired
by the attacker is given by the Mutual Information Iλ. Corollary
5 (pg. 1920) in Ref. [6], gives the information leaked to the
attacker:
Iλ =
1
ln2× 2λ =
1
ln2× 2n−t−r . (6)
A. Protocol steps
Table I list all steps of the protocol. The basis assigned for
each bit sent uses log2M to encode it and the process is contin-
uously sustained in rounds of s bits, in an unlimited way. This
procedure has been shown to be very fast in hardware.
A and B use the protocols in a concerted manner and extract
a sequence z of bits over which the attacker has no knowledge.
One should recall that the communication channel is classical
and the signals contain recorded optical noise modulating each
bit sent. At every round A and B know the basis used and they
use this to their advantage so that the noise VN does not disturb
identification of ai. A secure distilled stream of bits from A is
transferred to B.
The protocols proceeds to other similar runs. After n runs,
Alice and Bob share nz bits.
VI. LEAKAGE PROBABILITY AND MUTUAL INFORMATION
Iλ
Calculation of the mutual information Iλ that is directly con-
nected to the probability for an attacker to extract useful infor-
mation sent from A to B. It depends on the parameter t (number
of possibly leaked bits in a sequence sent).
In the wireless scheme the number of levels used as bases de-
pends on the digital hardware utilized (8 bits resolution→M =
256, 10 bits resolution → M = 1024 and so on). This con-
verter sets the maximum number of levels M . Voltage signals
Vk , (k = 0,1,2 . . .M) will represent these bases and to alter-
nate bits in nearby bases one may chose bases by voltage values
given by
Vk = Vmax
[
k
M
+
1− (−1)k
2
]
. (7)
At the same time, as voltage signals VN representing
recorded optical noise will be added to these values, these val-
ues should have a span smaller than Vmax (see Fig. 3). However,
TABLE I
PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION PROTOCOL FOR THE
WIRELESS PLATFORM
PA protocol
INITIALIZATION: A and B share c0 of size and entropy ms.
Station A
# ACTION OBJECTIVE
1a ai = GetString(PhRBG) Get bitstring from PhRBG
1b bi = ci−1[1,ms] Extract ms from pool for bases b
1c Code&Send(ai, bi) Send over classical channel
2 Send f Send instance of universal hash f
over classical channel
3a ci = f(ci−1||ai) A applies PA from ms+ s bits
reducing them to ms+ s− t−λ
3b zi = A uses s− t−λ
ci[ms+1,ms+ s−t−λ] bits from pool as the key stream z.
The remaining ms bits form
the bases for next round.
Station B
1a no matching step to A’s
1b bi = ci−1[1,ms] Get bases bits from initial pool value
1c ai =Receive&Decode(bi) Receive bits from classical channel
2 Receive f receive instance of universal hash f
3a ci = f(ci−1||ai) B applies PA from ms+ s bits
reducing them to ms+ s− t−λ
3b zi = B uses s− t−λ
ci[ms+1,ms+ s−t−λ] bits from pool as the key stream z.
The remaining ms bits form
the bases for next round.
this span must be large enough to cover a good number of bases
so that the attacker cannot resolve the basis bi when a bit ai
is sent. The actual optical noise has a continuous span but the
recorded region is set by digitalized levels of the ADC used.
Setting the spacing of signals for bases similar to the spacing
Vmax/M of recorded noise levels, one could set the digitalized
noise deviation, by adjusting the gain G, such that
Vmax/M  σV  Vmax . (8)
This condition can be mapped to the same formalism utilized
in the POVM (Positive Operator Valued Measure) calculation
developed in [2] and from which the leakage bit probability t
can be obtained. One may write the probability for indistin-
guishability between two levels separated by ∆k, as
P∆k = e
− |α|24
(
V∆k
Vmax
)2
= e−
|α|2
4
(∆k)2
M2 ≡ e−
∆k2
2(σk)
2 . (9)
The expected deviation σk in the number of levels is
σk =
√
2
〈n〉M , (10)
where 〈n〉= |α|2 and α is the coherent amplitude of a laser.
Calculation of the probability of error Pe for an attacker to
obtain a bit sent follows what was done in [2]. Fig. 4 exempli-
fies these errors for a set of M values (number of bases) and
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Fig. 4
PROBABILITY OF ERROR FOR AN ATTACKER ON A BIT AS A FUNCTION OF
THE NUMBER M OF BASES USED AND THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF
PHOTONS 〈n〉 CARRYING A BIT.
number 〈n〉 of photons detected. For a sequence of s bits sent
the parameter t (bit information leaked in s) in Eq. 6 will be
t= (0.5−Pe)×s. With t calculated and the safety parameter λ
defined, the probability for information that could be leaked to
the attacker is calculated. It can be shown [2] that t∼ 10−4 can
be easily obtained; therefore with a sequence os s = 106 bits
sent, this gives t∼ 102.
Fig. 5 exemplifies the PA effect by (log10 Iλ) (see Eq. 6) as a
function of r, (0,1)n→ (0,1)r, and t, number of bits leaked to
the attacker.
Fig. 5
log10 OF THE MUTUAL INFORMATION Iλ LEAKED TO THE ATTACKER
AFTER PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION IS APPLIED. IN THIS EXAMPLE 106 BITS
ARE SENT. t GIVES THE NUMBER OF BITS LEAKED TO THE ATTACKER
BEFORE PA IS APPLIED AND r IS THE DISTILLED OR USEFUL REMAINING
BITS.
VII. OTHER APPLICATION EXAMPLES
Above sections described the basic parts of the platform for
secure communications.
The use of a FPGA (Field Programmable Gated Array) and
memory allow functions like bit storage and encryption and per-
form the “Bit Pool” functions necessary. Custom tailored appli-
cations can also be programmed under this fast hardware pro-
cessing.
The current rack holding the PhRBG can be reduced to a
small size with output directly coupled to a smart phone. This
can provide true secure communications (bit-to-bit encryption)
between cellular telephone users as another application exam-
ple. It is also useful to call the attention to the reader that a de-
centralized protocol for bit-by-bit encryption for N−users ex-
ists [7]. Under this protocol, onceN users acquire a long stream
of random bits from the PhRBG, they can exchange secure in-
formation among them without any need to contact a central
station to synchronize their bit streams.
Both Secure Data and Voice Over Internet (VOIP) can be im-
plemented. It should be emphasized that it is important that the
key storage must be kept “outside” of the mobile device and that
the flow of information from the key generation and encrypting
unit to the device connected to the Internet should be strictly
controlled.
Other steps, more costly, can produce an ASIC (Application
Specific Integrated Circuit) to reduce the system to a chip size
device.
Another possible application example for the platform is to
feed a Software-Defined-Radio (SDR) with cryptographic keys
for bit-by-bit encryption/decryption capabilities. This could
bring absolute security for Data and Voice communications
through SDR.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It was shown how to achieve wireless secure communica-
tion at fast speeds with bit-to-bit symmetric encryption. The
hardware requirements was described and it was shown how
to calculate the security level associated to the communication.
Miniaturization steps may allow easy coupling to mobile de-
vices. The key storage have to be under control of the legit-
imate users and no key should ever be stored where a hacker
could have command/control of the system. A correct imple-
mented system would offer privacy at top-secret level for the
users. Furthermore, the correct choice of parameters creates a
post-quantum security privacy.
APPENDIX
A. PLATFORM - RACK IMPLEMENTATION
The PhRBG, within the platform, is seen as a rack implemen-
tation in Fig. 6 and some details in Fig. 7. A detailed description
of the PhRBG will be published elsewhere [8]. Just a brief de-
scription is presented here.
The PhRBG is an opto-electronic device designed to generate
bits continuously to supply any demand for bits at high speeds.
The physical principle involved, quantum vacuum fluctuations
that produce the optical shot-noise, is not bandwidth limited and
the device speed can be adapted to all electronic improvements.
Among the differences with other quantum random bit genera-
tors the presented device has no need for interferometry and a
single detector is used. This gives a time stable operation for
the system.
The PhRBG was currently implemented with off-the-shelf
components including low cost amplifiers (See G in Fig. 1).
These amplifiers have a frequency dependent gain profile (a
monotonous high gain at low frequencies) that introduces a low
6frequency bias in the bit generation. To compensate for this
bias without increasing costs a Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) is used in series with the bit output to produce an extra
randomization. This breaks –the expectedly more rare– long se-
quences of repeated bits. This process does not reduce the speed
of the PhRBG.
The currently implemented PhRBG works at ∼2.0 Gbit/sec
and passes all randomness tests to which it was submitted, in-
cluding the NIST suite described in “NIST’s Special Publication
800 - A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom
Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications”. Besides
Detector and
amplification
hard drive
PC – mother board
ADC
FPGA
Fig. 6
A TOP VIEW WITH SOME COMPONENTS OF THE PLATFORM. THE LASER,
DETECTOR, AMPLIFIER AND HARD DRIVE ARE AT THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE
RACK. THE ADC THAT FORMAT ANALOG SIGNALS FROM THE OPTICAL
AMPLIFICATION IS CONNECTED TO THE FPGA FOR PROCESSING. A
PC-MOTHERBOARD PROVIDES MANAGEMENT OF SEVERAL FUNCTIONS
INCLUDING A FRIENDLY GRAPHICAL INTERFACE FOR THE USER.
laser
fibers, 
optical isolator, 
attenuator
Fig. 7
DETAIL OF THE LASER LOCATION, OPTICAL ISOLATOR AND ATTENUATOR.
passing conventional randomness tests, some visual information
conveys the same idea. Fig. 8 shows amplitudes of a Fourier
analysis of a bit stream revealing the white spectrum character
of the generated bits. Figs. 9 and 10 show data and the expected
occurrence of random bits for a distribution where the probabil-
ity to occur 0 or 1s are equal, p = 1/2. It is expected that the
probability to occur a sequence of k identical bits (either 0 or 1)
is p(k) = 1/2k. If one changes basis 2 to basis “e” one writes
p(k) =
1
2k
= e−k ln2 ' e−0.693147 k . (11)
Data in Figs. 9 and 10 were fitted to p(n) = ce−an = celn2
1−n,
where will indicate a depart from the distribution p(k) = 1/2k.
Fig. 8
PLOT OF RELATIVE FOURIER AMPLITUDES Aν AS A FUNCTION OF THE
FREQUENCY ν . TRANSFORMING (0,1) SEQUENCES ONTO (−1,1)
SEQUENCES ALLOWS EASY FOURIER SPECTRUM ANALYSIS THAT SHOW
THE “WHITE-NOISE” CHARACTER OF THE OUTPUT SIGNALS.
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HISTOGRAM OF 1S. DOTS ARE OBTAINED FROM 1,277,874 BITS
OBTAINED AND THE SOLID LINE IS THE FIT TO c= 319018± 356 AND
=−0.003± 0.003.
The raw data [9] for the histograms are given by lists L1 and
L0:
L1 = {{1,159676},{2,79651},{3,40253},{4,20017},{5,9864},
{6,4960},{7,2567},{8,1239},{9,623},{10,313},{11,156},
{12,59},{13,37},{14,21},{15,9},{16,8},{17,3},{18,4},
{19,1},{20,0},{21,0}} (12)
L0 = {{1,159805},{2,79964},{3,39766},{4,20021},{5,9892},
{6,4962},{7,2488},{8,1306},{9,630},{10,336},{11,148},
{12,71},{13,42},{14,10},{15,11},{16,6},{17,2},{18,0},
{19,1},{20,1},{21,1}} . (13)
One should observe that the deviation parameter  is exponen-
tially small, giving an estimate of the randomness associated
with the generated bits.
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